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THE FUTURE OF FATCA:
CONCERNS AND ISSUES
by
John Paul

I.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization and technological advancements have
contributed to one of the more serious issues in the United
States – offshore tax evasion.1 While it is difficult to estimate
the exact amount of revenue losses from offshore tax schemes,
the U.S. loses approximately $100 billion per year from
offshore tax evasion. 2 This problem was highlighted in 2009
when Switzerland’s largest bank, UBS AG, admitted to
defrauding the United States by impeding the Internal Revenue
Service’s (IRS) tax revenue collection from U.S. taxpayers and
paid $780 million in fines, interest, penalties and restitution to
the U.S.3 As of 2016, eighty Swiss banks paid more than $1.3
billion in penalties to the U.S. in settlements involving more
than 34,000 accounts that held as much as $48 billion.4
The U.S. responded to the global problem of offshore
tax evasion by enacting the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
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Act (FATCA) 5 into law under section 501(a) of the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employments Act (HIRE), even though
the U.S. had many successful attempts at reigning in the
foreign banks that facilitated offshore tax evasion.6 The general
purpose of the HIRE Act was to provide tax breaks to small
businesses that hire unemployed workers. 7 FATCA was
designed to authorize the IRS to collect taxes on American
income hidden in foreign nations.8
The substantial costs associated with FATCA
compliance has proven to be a burden for many foreign
financial institutions.9 Instead of punishing shifty taxpayers and
corporations, the IRS misguidedly has placed practically the
entire burden on Americans living abroad and on the foreign
financial institutions where Americans invest and keep their
money. FATCA affects all U.S. citizens who own a foreign
financial account, including banking and investment accounts,
regardless of where they reside.10
This article will examine FATCA through presentations
of the: (1) pertinent background that gave rise to the law; (2)
essential elements of FATCA; and (3) analysis of the relevant
human rights, constitutional and security arguments against
FATCA.

II.

BACKGROUND

Although U.S. taxpayers had been hiding income
offshore for years, the IRS historically had little success
finding such income11. The primary reason for this failure was
that foreign financial institutions (FFIs) didn’t report any
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information to the IRS. Occasionally, the IRS became aware of
an offshore account,12 but the U.S. taxpayers were effectively
on the honor system. Given what has happened since 2007 13, it
would appear that many U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts
have not been very honorable.
The loss of revenue supports the argument that offshore
tax evasion is a crucial issue facing the U.S. Large sums of
money are squirreled away in tax haven jurisdictions such as
Aruba, the Cayman Islands and Dubai, whose laws allow some
U.S. citizens to evade paying U.S. income taxes.14 Former IRS
Commissioner Rossotti says the uncollected tax gap could be
in the range of $250 to $300 billion per year, which is the
equivalent of a 15 percent surtax on the honest taxpayer.15
To detect tax evasion, the IRS pursued U.S. citizens
with undeclared bank accounts in foreign banks. 16 But these
efforts were largely unsuccessful because FFIs did not fully
report U.S. account holders’ information.17 This allowed U.S.
citizens to avoid taxes on passive income, including interest,
dividends and capital gains by not reporting this income to the
IRS.18

A. Detecting Tax Evasion: OVCI and QI
During the period 1999 to 2003, two noteworthy events
occurred. First, the IRS started to pursue offshore accounts
when it (1) obtained credit card data from John Doe
summons, 19 and (2) offered its first offshore voluntary
compliance initiative (OVCI) in 2003.20 The OVCI resulted in
around 1,300 individuals identifying themselves to the IRS
with approximately $75 million collected through July 2003.21
The knowledge obtained by the IRS from pursuing various
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John Doe summons and structuring the OVCI greatly aided the
IRS when it pursued offshore accounts in Switzerland starting
in 2008.22
The second event occurred on January 1, 2001, which
was the date the U.S. implemented the Qualified Intermediary
(QI) system.23 Prior to 2001, FFIs did not: (1) collect U.S. tax
documentation with respect to any taxpayers; (2) withhold U.S.
tax, (3) file information returns with the IRS; or (4) submit to
IRS examinations. As a result: (1) a U.S. taxpayer could invest
in U.S. source assets with an FFI but the FFI was not required
to report anything to the IRS;24 and (2) U.S. banks were not
obtaining adequate documentation from FFIs to document a
reduced U.S. withholding tax rate on payments to foreign
customers of such FFIs.25
By implementing the QI system, the IRS was
attempting to address these two problems. As a result, the QI
system required QIs to identify their customers. If they were
foreign customers, the QI could keep the identity of the
customer secret as long as the correct amount of U.S.
withholding tax was collected. For U.S. customers, the QI was
required to report to the IRS any U.S. source income. To keep
the QIs honest, the QI system required an audit by either the
IRS or an independent auditor.26
While the QI system was a major advancement when
compared to the pre-2001 tax evasion environment, it became
apparent that it wasn’t working well at preventing U.S.
taxpayers from using offshore accounts to avoid U.S. taxes.
There were several major loopholes that U.S. taxpayers
exploited in order to avoid reporting income to the IRS.27
The loopholes of the QI system were: (1) that foreign
source income was not required to be reported; (2) there was
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no requirement to determine the beneficial owner; (3) that FFIs
were allowed to exclude certain customers from the QI system;
and (4) the QI audit was not really an audit but rather a list of
procedures that needed to be performed. 28 These loopholes
were on the minds of the IRS, the U.S. Treasury and the U.S.
Congressional staff when they proposed and drafted FATCA in
2009 and 2010 in light of the LGT and UBS scandals.29

B. The Liechtenstein Global Trust
and Union Bank of Switzerland
Tax Evasion Scandals
In February 2008, it was publicly disclosed that
German tax authorities had purchased customer account
information from an employee at the Liechtenstein bank of
LGT. This bank had close ties to the Liechtenstein royal
family. Apparently, the German tax authorities had shared the
information with nations around the world and the IRS initiated
an enforcement action against over 100 U.S. taxpayers with
offshore accounts at LGT.30
In May 2008, an even bigger scandal erupted when the
U.S. arrested Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS banker who
pleaded guilty one month later to assisting U.S. taxpayers
evade U.S. tax by using offshore accounts. Birkenfeld’s guilty
plea included all types of spy-like techniques used by
Birkenfeld and his colleagues to avoid U.S. detection. These
spy-like techniques included encrypted computers, code words,
smuggling diamonds in toothpaste tubes and more.31
Reports indicate that Bradley Birkenfeld came forward
under the IRS’s whistleblower program in 2007 and had been
disclosing information to the IRS for several months. However,
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he failed to disclose to the IRS and the Justice Department
information concerning his largest account, Igor Olenicoff. As
a result, despite blowing the whistle on UBS, Birkenfeld was
prosecuted and received a sentence of forty months.32
On June 30, 2008, the IRS filed a John Doe summons
with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, requesting that UBS disclose to the IRS all of its U.S.
customers that may have been avoiding the payment of U.S.
tax. One day later, UBS refused to comply with the summons
arguing that under Swiss bank secrecy law, they were not
permitted to disclose customer information.33
In July 2008, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations (PSI) held publicized hearings on offshore
accounts. At these hearings, IRS Commissioner Shulman gave
testimony surrounding offshore accounts and the QI system:
“Specifically, we are considering changes to the regulations to
require QIs to look through certain foreign entities – such as
trusts – to determine whether any U.S. taxpayers are beneficial
owners. We are also considering a regulation to have QIs
report U.S. taxpayers’ worldwide income to the IRS in certain
cases – not just U.S. source income.”34
The PSI report found that LGT and UBS assisted U.S.
clients in structuring their foreign accounts to avoid QI
reporting to the IRS. The report also found that the IRS should
broaden QI audits to require bank auditors to report evidence of
fraud or illegality.35 Since the QI system was created through
Treasury regulations and FFI contracts, the IRS and the
Treasury could have changed the QI rules without legislation.
However, since there was a strong desire to impose
withholding taxes on financial institutions that were not part of
the QI, legislation was needed.36 This is how FATCA would be
conceived.
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In August 2009, the IRS and UBS ultimately settled the
John Doe summons instead of allowing the Court to decide the
conflicts of law issue between U.S. and Swiss law. UBS agreed
to disclose information on approximately 4,450 U.S.
customers. 37 But given the loopholes and issues surrounding
the QI system, there was general agreement among senior IRS
officials that something had to be done. This is where FATCA
came in.38

III. FATCA EPITOMIZED

In 2010, FATCA amended the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 by adding a new Chapter 4. 39 In order to enforce
FACTA more easily, the U.S. entered into several
intergovernmental agreements (IGA), whereby foreign
governments agreed to collect the required information from
financial institutions located in their nations and disclose that
information to the IRS on an annual basis.40 While FATCA has
several focuses, the most pertinent facet of the law concern
FFIs and IGAs.41

A. The FATCA Regulation of FFIs
An alarming aspect of FATCA for FFIs is the severe
penalty associated with a violation. Any FFI that fails to meet
the FATCA reporting requirements will be subject to a
stringent 30% withholding tax on all payments of U.S. source
income.42 To avoid this penalty, an FFI must fall into one of
two categories: (1) it has an agreement with the U.S. Treasury
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Secretary; or (2) it meets certain criteria ensuring that it does
not maintain financial accounts owned by one or more U.S.
persons or U.S.-owned foreign entities.43
As discussed earlier, one of the major problems with the QI
system was the ability of the QI to ignore customer accounts.
One of the major FATCA design features was to require that a
QI have procedures to identify all U.S. customers within the QI
and potentially identify all U.S. customers in affiliated FFIs.44
For example, assume that a hypothetical foreign bank
has 2 million customers throughout the world, but only 1% of
such customers are U.S. persons and 2% of the foreign bank’s
customers have investments in the U.S. In this hypothetical
example, FATCA requires the foreign bank to perform detailed
customer due diligence procedures on its entire 2 million
customer base in order to properly identify the 3% that could
be directly impacted by FATCA. If the foreign bank did not
perform this customer due diligence effectively, it could be
subject to the penalty of 30% withholding tax on all payments
of U.S. source income.
This leads to the next problem regarding the payment of the
penalty. How would one determine whether a payment to an
FFI is attributable to a withholdable payment? The
IRS/Treasury has tentatively decided to apply a pro-rata
approach. 45 So, if 20% of a FFI’s worldwide assets are U.S.
assets, then 20% of the non-U.S. source payments to an FFI or
a recalcitrant account holder would be subject to the 30%
withholding tax penalty. Needless to say, this would lead to a
lot of administrative complexity, especially in cases where
local laws may restrict the collection of withholding tax on
payments that appear to be unrelated to the U.S.
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As an alternative, the FFI may elect “to be withheld upon
rather than withhold on payments to recalcitrant account
holders and nonparticipating FFIs” If an FFI elects this
alternative, the IRS will only withhold 30% of all withholdable
payments to the FFI that are directly attributable to the
recalcitrant account holder and nonparticipating FFI. 46
However, an FFI that elects this option will forfeit any rights it
may have under any treaty with the U.S. with respect to any
amount withheld as a result of such election – leading to a loss
of significant earnings for the FFI even after the FFI has
provided all of the lengthy, required information about the
account holder.
FATCA also has some loopholes. A FFI does not have to
report any depository accounts it maintains belonging to U.S.
beneficiaries when the aggregate value of all accounts the FFI
maintains is less than $50,000.47 Nor does a FFI have to report
any account held by another FFI that is in compliance with the
FATCA reporting requirements. 48 Furthermore, the U.S.
Treasury has chosen not to withhold the 30% penalty from
FFIs if the beneficial owner is: (1) part of a foreign
government; (2) part of an international agency; (3) a foreign
central bank; or (4) anyone else whom the U.S. Treasury
believes poses a low risk of tax evasion. 49 It is possible that
some FFIs may use these loopholes to circumvent FATCA
based on their connections and bargaining power.

B. Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs)
FATCA requires that FFIs enter into agreements with the
IRS that require the “participating” FFI to perform
identification and due diligence procedures concerning account
holders. 50 A different level of diligence is expected with
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respect to individual accounts and entity accounts as well as
between new and preexisting accounts.51 FFIs that comply with
the due diligence guidelines will be deemed to be compliant
with the identifying requirement and not held to the strict
liability standard.52
When the proposed regulations were released, the U.S.
Treasury also released a joint statement with the British,
French, German, Italian and Spanish governments regarding an
intergovernmental approach that would allow the financial
institutions of these nations to report the required FATCA
information to their own governments. These respective
governments would then report the data to the IRS. 53 The
intergovernmental approach framework would include the
elimination of the requirement of the FFI to negotiate a
separate agreement with the IRS. The U.S. Treasury stressed
that these IGAs are an alternative approach to obtaining the
information required by FATCA, not an exception. 54 The
European Commissioner of Taxation stated that the goal is to
develop a Model Agreement that could be used by all of the
Member Nations and ultimately lead to automatic information
exchange between countries.55
The U.S. Treasury is engaged in active negotiations
with a number of nations and jurisdictions so it is conceivable
that FATCA will become the global standard.56 More than 80
nations have signed on to the U.S. law.57 One ramification of
these IGAs is that in order for them to be productive, the U.S.
will must also provide these nations with information on
accounts held in U.S. financial institutions by the residents of
these nations. On behalf of the U.S. Treasury, Assistant
Secretary McMahon stated that “……bilateral solutions require
reciprocity.” 58 It is natural to speculate that such an
undertaking may lead to information leaks.
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The exchange process under FATCA is constantly
changing and many are worried about the implications of this
everchanging process. 59 There are many increased risks and
costs associated with FATCA.

IV. FATCA ISSUES

The FATCA withholding tactics will only bring an
estimated $1 billion of lost taxes back to the U.S.60 While $1
billion may sound like a substantial amount, it pales in
comparison to the estimated $99 billion of American taxes that
will remain lost every year as well as the extremely high cost
of FATCA compliance to FFIs. 61 The estimated cost of
FATCA implementation is $100 million per financial
institution.62
Industry experts estimate that about 900,000 FFIs are
subject to FATCA, which means that the total cost of FATCA
implementation of $90 billion will dramatically overcome its
potential tax savings of $1 billion.63 With an estimated success
rate of 1% and the hefty costs placed on FFIs, many Americans
may have their foreign bank accounts closed as a result of
FATCA.64
FATCA has been met with accusations ranging from claims
of unfair treatment, to human rights abuse, to constitutional
issues to privacy and security leaks, from within the U.S. and
abroad.65
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A. Unfair Treatment
The nonprofit, nonpartisan, volunteer association with a
caucus in Congress, American Citizens Abroad, stated in a
letter to the Congressional Ways and Means Committee that it
has “received multiple testimonies of Americans residing
overseas who have had bank accounts in their country of
residence closed, who have been denied entry into foreign
pension plans and insurance contracts, who have had
mortgages cancelled, who have been pushed off joint-bank
accounts held with foreign spouses.”66
Furthermore, American Citizens Abroad claims that
Americans living abroad cannot easily withdraw their money
from the closed foreign account and redeposit it with U.S.
financial institutions because the Patriot Act discourages U.S.
financial institutions from taking on clients living overseas.67
So “the average American living abroad is shut off from all
avenues for personal investment.”68
In addition to being closed out from financial
institutions, Americans living abroad may find it more difficult
to become owners in new overseas business ventures due to
FATCA’s requirement that such ventures be reported to the
IRS if at least 10% of the venture is owned by one or more
Americans.69

B. Human Rights Abuse
In order to implement FATCA, Americans living
abroad must be singled out on the basis of their national
origin. 70 American Citizens Abroad believes FATCA forces
FFIs and foreign governments to discriminate against
Americans.71
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While New Zealand is known for upholding human
rights, its government officials have acknowledged their
intention to displace human rights in order to comply with
FATCA. 72 In a letter published by New Zealand’s tax
authority, Internal Revenue, the New Zealand government
determined that violating the rights of U.S. persons was
necessary, given the risk under FATCA of either being shut out
of the U.S. investment market or facing the 30% withholding
penalty associated with noncompliance.73
If FATCA does discriminate against Americans, it
would be a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), 74 which as adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1948.75 The UDHR clearly states that no
person shall be discriminated against on the basis of national
origin and no distinction is made because of the nation a person
comes from.76
A number of legal cases involving FATCA have
already surfaced. In 2014, the Dutch Board for the Protection
of Human Rights ruled against FATCA on the basis of
nationality discrimination. 77 Also in 2014, several Canadian
citizens filed a lawsuit against the Canadian Attorney General
in Federal Court in Canada.78 The Canadian plaintiffs hope to
prevent the Canadian government from turning over private
bank account information under FATCA from more than one
million United States persons and their families who live in
Canada.79 In 2016, Rand Paul and several other plaintiffs filed
a suit against the U.S. Treasury and other government agencies
over foreign bank account reporting requirements under the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act; however, an Ohio
District Court judge dismissed this suit for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), without
prejudice.80
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C. Constitutionality of IGAs
The U.S. Treasury began implementing IGAs with
foreign nations when dealing with the difficulty of
implementing FATCA overseas. 81 Since the U.S. Treasury is
an administrative agency under the Executive branch, these
IGAs are considered executive agreements. 82 Executive
agreements are limited in scope; “according to the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., the President may
validly conclude executive agreements that (1) cover matters
that are solely within his executive power, or (2) are made
pursuant to a treaty, or (3) are made pursuant to a legitimate act
of Congress.”83
IGAs were never mentioned as a proviso of the HIRE
Act, so technically, the President has no power to form IGAs
through the use of executive agreements; this means that the
IGAs must go through the Senate treaty making process to
legitimately bind the U.S.84 But since the FACTA IGAs were
never brought to the Senate, there is no statutory authorization
under which the IRS may enter into them and they are not
treaty-based amendments.85 This indicates that the IGAs have
no congressional authorization, which in turn means that they
must be sole executive agreements. 86 If the IGAs are sole
executive agreements, then they are not binding because the
Executive branch does not have the power to enter into such
agreements if they are to bind the U.S. globally.87
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D. Privacy and Security Leaks
FATCA has caused Americans living abroad to be even
more afraid of security risks when their personal financial
information is reported by non-U.S. financial institutions or
foreign government agencies to the IRS. 88 FATCA reporting
will include: (1) the name, address and taxpayer identification
number of each US account holder at the financial institution;
(2) the account number; (3) account balance and value; (4) the
account’s gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments;
and (5) other account related information requested by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 89 The Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration has voiced concerns with the
security of data transmission as required by FATCA.90
In September 2014, the IRS issued a fraud alert to all
international financial institutions that are complying with
FATCA. Scam artists posing as the IRS have fraudulently
solicited financial institutions seeking the identities of account
holders as well as their financial account information. 91
Financial institutions registered to comply with FATCA, and
those in jurisdictions that have an IGA in effect to implement
the FATCA provisions through their local governments, have
already been approached by parties impersonating themselves
as the IRS. The IRS now has reports of incidents from various
countries and continents.92
The issues of unfair treatment, human rights abuse,
unconstitutionality and security are all reasons supporting the
repeal of FATCA, especially since the costs of implementing
FATCA far outweigh the benefits it may derive.
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V. CONCLUSION

While tax evasion is an enormous problem, FATCA is
not a solution to the problem. FATCA was primarily created to
deal with the weaknesses of the QI system but it has turned out
to be a case of overregulation that infringes upon the rights of
Americans who live abroad. A strengthening of the QI system
may have been enough to adequately address the issue of
global tax evasion without the need to create a costly, massive
piece of legislation that infringes on the rights of so many and
may prove to be a threat to security.
Given the facts that (1) many Americans living abroad
have been denied access into their foreign pensions, insurance
contracts and bank accounts as a result of FATCA; (2) many
Americans may be singled out on the basis of their national
origin because of FACTA; (3) the constitutionality of FACTA
may be questionable; and (4) scam artists have already
obtained personal information about people as a result of the
FACTA data transmission, it is clear that FACTA should be
repealed.
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